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1. THE MODEL OF EMERGING TRUTH
In Part 1 of his paper, Weinstein elaborates a meta-mathematical model which, taking
physical chemistry as its paradigm, attempts to represent in a rigorous and transparent
manner the interconnections of those features in virtue of which prevailing theories in the
natural sciences come to be seen as entrenched or anchored—that is to say, as
epistemically well-grounded. The features in question are functions of the development
of those theories over time, and concern
(i) the extent to which over time applications of a theory T (conceived of as a
series of models of T generated by interpreting T as applicable to specific,
more limited domains) have steadily improved the empirical fit between T
and the data it attempts to explain,
(ii) the extent to which over time applications of T to new and different domains
exhibits the same sort of steadily improving empirical fit between T and the
data it attempts to explain,
(iii) the extent to which over time what T says has been explained by better and
better “reducing” theories which reinterpret the expressions of T in a way that
illuminates what T is “really” about—for example, coming to understand or
explain the correlation between the pressure and temperature of a gas in an
enclosed container as described in Boyle’s law by equating temperature with
the mean kinetic energy of the molecules making up the gas and equating
pressure with force exerted by those molecules on the walls of the container. 1
1

Weinstein’s account does not deal explicitly, it seems to me, with an important fact about typical
reductions which Sellars called attention a long time ago to, and which is well illustrated by the kinetic
theory of gases as applied to Bolye’s law. Sellars points out that “theories” typically explain why
“empirical laws” are successful to the extent that they are successful, but also explain why they fail at the
points at which they fail. Boyle’s law, taken literally, predicts a straight line correlation between pressure
and temperature. As a matter of empirical fact, this is contrary to what is observed. A graph of observed
values with temperature on the X axis and pressure on the Y axis is a straight line up to a certain point, after
which pressure values do not keep pace, as it were, with temperature values. The kinetic theory explains
this: as temperature increases (i.e. as the velocity of the molecules making up the gas increases) collisions
between the molecules becomes more frequent, and most such collisions increase the time it takes for the

Pinto, R. C. (2009). Commentary on Mark Weinstein’s “Two Contrasting Cultures.” In: J. Ritola
(Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-6), Windsor, ON:
OSSA.
Copyright © 2009, the author.

ROBERT C. PINTO

Weinstein claims that his model of emerging truth can help explain the varying
strength of the warrants which Toulmin had claimed connect the premises of an
argument to its conclusion. This is made possible by
(a) construing a warrant as a substantive generalization of the sort David
Hitchcock showed us how to identify as the “covering generation” of an
argument and
(b) viewing such generalizations as “explanatory consequences” of some theory
T, where the strength as a warrant is a function of the extent to which T is
embedded or anchored in virtue of the 3 sorts of features just described.
On the basis of his model, in Part 2 he defines a series of 5 statuses a theory can
have—each status in the series representing a higher greater degree of entrenchment. It is
by reference to these statuses that he formulates three “dialectical principles”—whose
root idea is that the dialectical obligation of someone who holds a theory T to account for
an anomaly gets weaker as the status of T increases.
As with any bold and interesting attempt to deal with a significant problem, there
is plenty of room to quibble about the details. 2 However, in my view, this is a deep and
colliding molecules to reach the sides of the container, thereby retarding the increase in pressure. I suspect
Weinstein (who actually mentions this example in 2006b, p. 58) would see this simply as a case in which
reduction, in a sense, increases empirical fit, but I see it as more than this—as a case in which reduction
induces revision of the theory being reduced (i.e., in one way or another alters the sentences of T).
Analogous issues arise if we see the relation between Newtonian mechanics and both the special (STR) and
general theories of relativity (GTR) as a reduction relationship, or as analogous to a reduction relationship.
What Newtonian mechanics says about computing the velocity of C in relation to A on the basis of the
velocity of A in relation to be and B in relation to A (namely, that you simply add the two latter velocities)
is, from the perspective STR, is at best only approximately correct, and is not even approximately correct
for situations in which velocities approach the speed of light. What GTR says about gravitational force
contradicts what Newton’s inverse square law says about gravitational force, even though it explains why
the values generated by the inverse square law are approximately correct in many circumstances.
2
I personally have reservations about at least three of the details of the story as Weinstein is currently
telling it. (1) As far as I can see, on Weinstein’s model a theory can achieve a better and better empirical fit
only as a result of varying interpretations of the same set of sentences (it is differing interpretations of the
same set of sentences which generate the sequence of models which may or may not exhibit a better fit). To
my mind, this is counterintuitive. I much prefer Lakatos’ (1970) account, according to which what is
judged to be progressive is a research program in which many (perhaps all) of the sentences put forward
change over time, even though the core idea which defines the research program remains the same. On
Lakatos’ account, the criterion of progressiveness is not necessarily goodness of empirical fit (which can
easily be achieved by ad hocery), but whether the adjustments made to accommodate anomalies yield
overall theories which, among other things, make new and previously unforeseen predictions that turn out
to be true. Perhaps what this indicates in an interaction between what Weinstein calls being “model
progressive” and being “model chain progressive.” (2) Weinstein, like Hitchcock (and unlike Toulmin, I
maintain) appears to equate warrants with covering generalizations of the sort that Hitchcock identified.
My view is that, as Toulmin (2003/1958, p. 98) said, a warrant is “is a general moral of a practical
character, about the ways in which we can safely argue in view of” the facts put forward as backing for the
warrant. See Pinto (2006, section 5, esp. pp. 298-300) for my view on the form a warrant should take.
Weinstein might want to accommodate this point by construing nomic generalizations after the manner of
Sellars (1963, chapters 10 and 11) as essentially rules of inference. (3) In a parallel account of MET,
Weinstein (2006a, p. 54) has said, “Truth, in the final analysis, will be identified with the progressive
appearance of a model that deserves to be chosen,” invoking Peirce’s view of truth as “the ideal limit to
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promising account of the interconnections that are relevant to the assessment of any
contemporary attempt at serious natural science. Anyone interested in argumentation
theory owes it to himself or herself to make the effort to become thoroughly familiar with
it. 3
Weinstein (2006b, p. 81) has said
The intuitive appeal of the construction […] is based on accepting the brute fact that mature
physical science is the most effective epistemic enterprise available, and thus a likely paradigm for
a theory of truth […]

But it remains to be seen whether and to what extent his model will prove
illuminating when applied to inquiries outside the realm of physical science. There are
two reasons why I am less than sanguine about its prospects for illuminating the
epistemic status of theories and/or accounts in what Dilthey called the
Geisteswissenschaften—roughly, the sciences or studies that deal with human things.
First, to a considerable degree what Dennett called “intentional explanation” remains
central to the explanatory potential of such inquiries (for starters think of history,
economics, current cognitive psychology) and, as Dennett 4 and Davidson 5 both make
clear, intentional explanation is not oriented by the sort of nomic generalizations which
which endless investigations tend.” Like many others, I am sceptical of the notion of a limit—ideal or
otherwise - toward which “endless investigations” are tending. To put the matter in other words, just as I
am sceptical of the concept of a being than which no greater being can be conceived, I am sceptical of the
idea of a model than which no better model could be conceived. Of course, the concept of truth must be
accommodated in some manner or other—but ought not, I think, to be accommodated in this manner.
However, I find what I take to be Weinstein’s idea that judging a theory T from the perspective of
successor theories—and most particularly from the perspective of a reducing theory R which reveals what
T was “really” about—can shed important light on the concept of closeness to the truth (Popper’s
“verisimilitude”).
3
For those willing to make that effort, I would personally suggest that a good place to start is Weinstein
2006b, followed up with Weinstein 2006a.
4
For Dennett (1981, p. 6), one adopts the “intentional stance” toward a system when one assumes the
system’s “rationality” (which for Dennett equates to optimal design) and “one predicts behavior […] by
ascribing to the system the possession of certain information and supposing it to be directed by certain
goals, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions
and suppositions.” In other words, what guides us from the ascription of information and supposition of a
certain goal to the conclusion about what the system will do is not an empirically grounded nomic
generalization to the effect that entities possessing such-and-such information and having a goal of a
certain sort always or usually acts in such-and-such way. What guides us is rather our estimation of what is
it is reasonable or appropriate to do in light of that information and that goal.
It is worth stressing that Dennett (Ibid., p 15) also says, “Intentional theory is vacuous as
psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.” For more on the
significance of that remark, see the second paragraph of note 6 below.
5
Davidson (2001, p. xvi) says that in “Actions, Reasons and Causes” he accepts
the view that teleological explanation of action differs from explanation in the natural sciences in
that laws are not essentially involved in the former but hold[s] that both sorts of explanation can,
and often must, invoke causal connections.
In “Mental Events,” Davidson (2001, p. 224) goes even further and endorses “the Principle of the
Anomalism of the Mental: there are no strict laws at all on the basis of which we can explain and predict
mental phenomena.”
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are central to the explanations recognized by MET and which Weinstein wants to equate
with warrants. And second, I’m aware of hardly anything in the realm of the
Geisteswissenschaften that I would consider a successful reduction in which a reducing
theory sheds significant light on the ontology of the theory that’s being reduced. 6
2. WEINSTEIN ON POLITICAL ARGUMENT
Let me set out what I think Weinstein is saying about political argument and political
discourse in Part 3 of his paper. He distinguishes three sorts of claims or conclusions
operative in such discourse:
(a) those licensed by warrants whose backing lies in broad political (or
ideological) perspectives
6

At one point Weinstein (2006a, p. 67) does in fact note the “hope that mental predicates can be reduced to
states of the central nervous system”—citing Churchland 1988. But those like the Churchlands who look to
neuroscience for “ultimate explanations” of psychological phenomena are not proposing to reduce the
referents of “folk psychological” predicates to states of the central nervous system; like Skinner and
Watson before them, the Churchlands look forward to a future in which science will be able to eliminate
the folk psychological terminology still employed in today’s mainstream cognitive psychology in favor of a
scientific vocabulary which avoids them altogether. Skinner’s view was that it isn’t the business of the
psychology as such to speculate about the neurological underpinnings of behaviour—to oversimplify
slightly, scientific psychology should be concerned only with the influence of environment on behaviour,
and should brook no speculations about “intervening variables” that mediate the interplay among
behaviour, reinforcers and discriminative stimuli. The Churchlands view, on the other hand, is that
psychology ought to aim at explanations of behaviour which rely on neuropsychological constructs which
are largely yet to be identified. As things presently stand, in those areas where current discoveries about the
functioning of the brain and the nervous system are throwing important light on human behaviour, thought
and emotion, cerebral and neurological states and occurrences can rarely be identified with “mental events,”
though they are readily seen to be causes of various aspects of our cognitive and emotional lives. However,
as Jerry Fodor keeps pointing out, for the most part the only explanations of concrete behaviour currently
available to us are in terms of belief, desire, etc. According to him, belief/desire explanation is “the only
game in town.”
It is worth noting that Dennett (1981, p. xx of the Preface) explicitly aligns himself with
eliminative materialism in certain respects. Thus says that “beliefs, desires, pains, mental images,
experiences” as ordinarily understood are not “good theoretical entities.” He says that some ordinary mental
entity terms—but not those just mentioned—may “deserve mention in a mature psychology.” About
those—and about “the theoretical entities that eventually supplant beliefs, desires,“ etc., in a mature
psychology he is, he says, a “homuncular functionalist.” One can get a sense of the direction in which he is
moving when he says (p. 12), “In the end we want to be able to explain the intelligence of man, or beast, in
terms of his design, and this in turn in terms of the natural selection of this design.” And it needs to be
recalled that he had earlier said (p. 4),
The essential feature of the design stance is that we make predictions solely from knowledge or
assumptions about the systems functional design, irrespective of the physical constitution or
condition of the innards of the particular object.
If these sentences capture the thrust of Dennett’s research program, he does not envisage fleshing it out
with appeals to neuropsychology.
With respect to these issues, consider also the arguments Davidson (2001, pp. 214-25) mounts in
“Mental Events” in support of “anomalous monism”—the view which holds that all events are physical, but
“rejects the thesis […] that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations” (p. 214).
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(b) those licensed by “normative tending warrants, ranging from prudential
requirements such as policies on cost value analysis to more deeply
intractable commitments as in substantive moral constraints (equal
opportunity, specific rights, appeals to the common good)”—about which
Weinstein has little to say here
(c) those licensed by warrants whose backing lies in social and political facts and
theories—these include (i) warrants “grounded in law and other de facto
political policies,” (ii) warrants “drawn from and by analogy with social
science principles, sociological, psychological and even anthropological
claims that proffer generalizations of various strengths about human
behaviour” and (iii) warrants whose backing lies in economic fact and theory.
Having distinguished these phenomena, there are two central points he makes
about the first and third.
1) Broad political perspectives
leave little room for rational negotiation, since they result in parallel perspectives, equally
persuasive to their adherents, but relatively incapable of creating consensus […] (p. 9)

2) Discussions which eschew appeal to broad political or ideological
perspectives appeal instead to “shared backing and available economic
models.” Weinstein thinks that the merits of proposals made “in light of such
backing” can yield to “rational negotiation.” He thinks that their merits can
and should be assessed in light of the dialectical principles described in Part
2—which, of course, presuppose his theory of emerging truth.
I think Weinstein is absolutely right to call attention to the difference between
political arguments that turn on appeal to “broad political perspectives” and those that
don’t, and is correct in his explanation and assessment of the futility of such argument in
the public sphere. Moreover, I think he is right to suppose having a model like—or, as I
would rather say, loosely analogous to—MET would help us in understanding what is at
stake when we try to assess proposals which appeal to “shared backing and available
economic models.” However, in light of my remarks above about the
Geisteswissenschaften, I remain sceptical about how much light a model which takes
physical chemistry as its paradigm will be able to shed on the assessment of such
proposals.
3. WEINSTEIN’S POSTSCRIPT
In his Postscript Weinstein says,
The best we can hope for is a broad liberal education that permits of the evaluation of expert
presentations based on a basic familiarity with the field and its arguments along with a spirit of
critical inquiry.
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He connects this point with McPeck’s rejection of the very idea of a course in critical
thinking or (what is not the same thing) informal logic. Indeed Weinstein concludes with
the words, ”informal logic as a quasi-formal discipline is impossible.” It seems to me that
none of this is warranted by the fact that “evaluation of expert presentations” must be
“based on a basic familiarity with the field and its arguments.” To what “field” does that
point, and the arguments for it, belong? Surely both arise from an examination of
argument as it occurs in a broad variety of different fields as well as argumentation that
transpires in “the public sphere,” an examination carried out against the background of
the literature produced by a certain research community—that is to say, from informal
logic. Of course, introduction to or mastery of informal logic does not suffice for
evaluating expert presentations made by physicists, or chemists, or theologians, or
clinical psychologists. Indeed, that is one of the main ideas to be got across in a course in
critical thinking or informal logic, And at my university such courses are the only place a
student is likely to encounter notion that he or she needs a broad liberal education of the
sort Weinstein has in mind.
Link to paper
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